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Narrowing Interjurisdictional
Immunity
Peter W. Hogg and Rahat Godil

I. INTRODUCTION
Canada is a federal state with governmental power distributed between
one federal and 10 provincial authorities. Although each level of government
enjoys a measure of constitutional sovereignty, laws enacted by the
federal Parliament may have ramifications for the provinces and laws
enacted by the provincial legislatures may have ramifications for the
federal realm. The “interjurisdictional immunity” doctrine is part of the
framework of principles of Canadian federalism aimed at reconciling
federal values with the reality that laws enacted by one level of government
will inevitably have an impact on matters within the jurisdiction of the
other level of government. The dominant principle is the “pith and
substance” doctrine, which tolerates the co-existence of laws of the two
levels of government in the same field. One exception to this general
principle of concurrency is the “paramountcy” doctrine, which provides
for the priority of federal laws in cases where there is a direct conflict
between federal and provincial law. A second exception to the general
principle of concurrency is the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, which
provides for a limited degree of immunity for federal undertakings from
laws enacted by the provinces. It is the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine
that is the subject of this paper.
The law on interjurisdictional immunity has undergone considerable
evolution in the last few decades. The most recent development is the
Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in the two landmark decisions of
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Canadian Western Bank1 and Lafarge,2 which were decided in 2007,
where the court shifted the balance of federalism in the direction of the
provinces by restricting the application of interjurisdictional immunity.
The first part of this paper will describe the interjurisdictional immunity
doctrine and distinguish it from the pith and substance doctrine and the
paramountcy doctrine. The second part of the paper will describe the
history and development of interjurisdictional immunity. Historically,
the inquiry was framed in terms of whether a provincial law sterilized,
paralyzed or impaired a federal undertaking or subject. The Supreme
Court relaxed this strict test in the seminal cases of Commission du
Salaire Minimum v. Bell Telephone Co.3 and Bell Canada v. Quebec,4 by
eliminating the requirement of impairment or sterilization and holding
that provincial legislation was inapplicable to federal undertakings
whenever it “affected” a vital part of a federal undertaking or core of
federal jurisdiction. After applying the more relaxed test for over 40
years, the Supreme Court in Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge has
reverted back to the more restrictive approach to interjurisdictional
immunity, rejecting the “affects” test in favour of an “impairment” test.
The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity is now restricted to the case
where a core competence of Parliament, or a vital part of a federal
undertaking, would be impaired by a provincial law. In the last part of
this paper, we will comment on the wisdom of this move from a legal
and policy perspective.

II. WHAT IS INTERJURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY?
1. Meaning of Interjurisdictional Immunity
The term interjurisdictional immunity does not have a precise
meaning,5 but the doctrine is rooted in the idea that legislation enacted
by one order of government cannot interfere with the core of any subject
matter that is under the jurisdiction of the other order of government.
When the doctrine applies, the law is valid in most of its applications,
1

Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge, [2007] S.C.J. No. 23, [2007] 2 S.C.R.
86 (S.C.C.).
3
[1966] S.C.J. No. 51, [1966] S.C.R. 767 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bell 1966”].
4
[1988] S.C.J. No. 41, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bell 1988”].
5
P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2007), annually
supplemented, s. 15.8 [hereinafter “Hogg”].
2
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but it is interpreted so as not to apply to the matter that is outside the
jurisdiction of the enacting body. The technique for limiting the
application of the law to matters within the jurisdiction is to read it
down, that is, to construe it narrowly so as to exclude matters outside the
jurisdiction of the enacting body. In this regard, the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity is distinct from the pith and substance
doctrine as well as the paramountcy doctrine, as discussed below.6 The
latter two deal with questions of validity and operability, respectively,
whereas interjurisdictional immunity is concerned with the issue of
application.
The logic of interjurisdictional immunity would make it applicable
to both federal and provincial laws, but in fact it has only been used
against provincial laws.7 A provincial law that is otherwise valid in
relation to a provincial subject matter is read down in order to exclude
the core of a federal subject matter to which it also ostensibly applies.
2. Difference between Interjurisdictional Immunity and Pith and
Substance
The pith and substance doctrine comes into play in determining the
validity or constitutionality of a statute on federal grounds. It is
concerned with the characterization of the challenged law by identifying
its dominant or most important characteristic, or its leading feature, also
sometimes referred to as the “matter” of the challenged law, keeping in
mind that statutes can often have more than one feature or aspect.
Depending on how the “pith and substance” of a statute is characterized,
a law enacted by one level of government may validly affect matters
outside its jurisdiction, or it may be declared invalid. For example, in the
leading case of Bank of Toronto v. Lambe,8 the Privy Council upheld a
provincial law which imposed a tax on banks, notwithstanding that
banks are federal undertakings. This is because the dominant feature of
the law was to raise revenue, and accordingly its “pith and substance”
was found to be “in relation to” taxation (a provincial matter), which
merely “affected” banking (a federal matter). The pith and substance
doctrine permitted the law to validly “affect” banking, even though
banking was outside the legislative authority of the province. On the
6
7
8

Id., s. 15.8(f).
See section II.2 of this article.
(1887) 12 App. Cas. 575 (P.C.).
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other hand, a provincial law imposing a tax on banks was struck down in
Alberta (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General).9 The
provincial law in that case was part of a social credit programme. It
imposed a special tax on banks, and the magnitude of the tax was such
that it could have the effect of preventing banks from carrying on their
business in the province. In that case, the Privy Council held that the
purpose of the law was to discourage the operation of banks in the
province. Its pith and substance was in relation to the federal subject of
banking and the raising of revenue was merely incidental.
Interjurisdictional immunity is an exception to the pith and
substance doctrine because it stipulates that there is a core to each
federal subject matter that cannot be reached by provincial laws. In Bank
of Toronto v. Lambe,10 the obligation to pay a tax was not regarded as
part of the protected core of banking, which meant that an otherwise
valid provincial tax could validly apply to the banks. But a provincial
law that limited the right of creditors in the province to enforce their
debts would touch the protected core of banking and would therefore be
inapplicable to the banks, although it would be a valid provincial law in
relation to property and civil rights in most if not all of its other
applications. Such a law would be read down to exclude the banks from
the definition of creditors to whom the law applied.
3. Difference between Interjurisdictional Immunity and
Paramountcy
The doctrine of paramountcy stipulates that when there is a valid
federal law and a valid provincial law governing the same matter, and
there is a conflict (or inconsistency) between the two, the federal law
prevails and the provincial law is rendered inoperative to the extent of
the inconsistency. Paramountcy only applies to the extent of the
inconsistency and does not affect the operation of those parts of the
provincial law which are not inconsistent with the federal law.
Moreover, it only affects the operation of provincial law so long as the
inconsistent federal law is in force.
Interjurisdictional immunity differs from paramountcy in that it is a
restriction on the constitutional authority of the provincial legislatures.
When the doctrine applies, the provincial law is invalid in its application
9
10

[1939] A.C. 117 (P.C.).
Supra, note 8.
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to a core federal subject matter. It does not matter whether the federal
Parliament has enacted conflicting or inconsistent federal legislation, or
any legislation at all. The province is constitutionally disabled from
going there. Paramountcy, on the other hand, only comes into play when
there is valid federal legislation as well as valid provincial legislation,
and there is conflict or inconsistency between the two. When
paramountcy applies, the provincial law is not invalid, it is merely
“inoperative”. If the federal law were repealed or amended to remove the
conflict, the provincial law, which was always valid, would spring back
into operation.

III. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERJURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY
1. Sterilizing or Impairing Status or Essential Powers of a Federal
Company
The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity finds its roots in cases
dealing with federally incorporated companies, where it was held that
otherwise valid provincial laws cannot sterilize or impair the status or
essential powers of a federally incorporated company (“federal company”).
Thus, if a province enacts a law which is within its legislative
competence, but which would have the effect of impairing the status or
essential powers of a federal company, then the law is inapplicable to
federal companies.
This form of interjurisdictional immunity was established in the
famous cases of John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton11 and Great West
Saddlery Co. v. The King.12 In those cases, the Privy Council had to
determine the validity of several provincial statutes (“extra-provincial
companies statutes”) which prohibited companies that were not
incorporated under the law of the enacting province from carrying on
business within the province, unless they obtained a licence from a
provincial official. The laws were not directed solely at federal
companies but applied indifferently to all companies incorporated
outside the province, including companies incorporated in other
provinces and other countries. The Privy Council held that the laws
essentially denied corporate status to companies incorporated outside the
11
12

[1914] J.C.J. No. 2, [1915] A.C. 330 (P.C.).
[1921] J.C.J. No. 1, [1921] 2 A.C. 91 (P.C.).
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province. It was open to the provinces to deny corporate status to
companies incorporated in other provinces or other countries, but the
laws were inapplicable to federal companies.
As well as the extra-provincial companies statute, a second law was
challenged in Great West Saddlery, and that was the Ontario Mortmain
Act,13 which prohibited all companies from acquiring or holding land in
the province, except with a provincial licence. The Privy Council
reached the opposite conclusion with respect to that law, holding that
federal companies were not excluded from its application. The rationale
for this distinction is that provincial regulation of federal companies
through licensing is not inherently problematic — there is no
constitutional objection to a province providing for the licensing of
federal companies, demanding the payment of licence fees, and imposing
financial penalties for non-payment of fees. The constitutionally
objectionable aspect of the extra-provincial companies statutes was the
fact that failure to obtain a licence resulted in the prohibition of all
corporate activity in the province, amounting to a complete loss of
corporate status or an essential corporate power. The Mortmain Act, on
the other hand, while it undoubtedly restricted the powers of a federal
company in Ontario by prohibiting the holding of land, did not impair
the status or essential powers of the federal companies that operated
within the province.14
2. Sterilizing, Paralyzing or Impairing a Federal Undertaking
The idea of interjurisdictional immunity expanded from the
company cases into cases concerning federally regulated undertakings.
Until 1966, undertakings which came within federal jurisdiction (for
example, banks or companies engaged in interprovincial or international
communication or transportation) were held to be immune from
otherwise valid provincial laws only if the laws had the effect of
sterilizing, paralyzing or impairing the federally authorized activity. For

13

Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, R.S.O. 1914, c. 103.
Similar decisions were rendered in the context of securities regulation. A provincial
licensing requirement for the issue of stocks or bonds was held inapplicable to federal companies:
Reference re The Sale of Shares Act, 1924 (Man.), [1928] J.C.J. No. 6, [1929] A.C. 260 (P.C.);
while a provincial requirement that companies issue stocks or bonds only through licensed sales
personnel was held applicable to federal companies: Lymburn v. Mayland, [1932] J.C.J. No. 2,
[1932] A.C. 318 (P.C.).
14

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) NARROWING INTERJURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY

629

example, in Bell 1905,15 an interprovincial telephone company was
found to be immune from provincial law requiring the consent of a
municipality for the erection of telephone poles and wires. Similarly, an
international bus line was held immune from provincial regulation
regarding routes and rates in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Winner16 and
an interprovincial pipeline was held immune from provincial mechanics
liens legislation in Campbell-Bennett Ltd. v. Comstock Midwestern Ltd.17
In all of these cases, the courts took the view that, if the provincial law
were applicable, it had the potential to bring a halt to the federally
regulated activity. The provincial law was held to be inapplicable.
3. Affecting a Vital Part of a Federal Undertaking
In Bell 1966,18 the Supreme Court of Canada relaxed the test for
interjurisdictional immunity. Abandoning the language of sterilization,
paralysis or impairment, the Court held that the Bell Telephone
Company (an interprovincial undertaking) was immune from a
provincial minimum wage law on the lesser standard that such a law
“affects a vital part of the management and operation of the
undertaking”.19 The decision significantly expanded the scope of
interjurisdictional immunity. Imposing a provincial minimum wage on
the Bell Telephone Company could hardly sterilize, paralyze or even
impair the operation of the company’s undertaking. That did not matter.
It was sufficient if the law “affected” a vital part of the undertaking, and
the regulation of labour standards affected a vital part of the
management of the undertaking. There was no federal minimum wage at
that time (there is now), so that the decision meant that workers in
federal industries were no longer protected by minimum wage laws.
“Affecting a vital part” continued to be the test for interjurisdictional
immunity for the next four decades. The Supreme Court of Canada
reaffirmed its commitment to this test in a trilogy of cases decided in
1988, where provincial occupational health and safety laws were held to
be inapplicable to three federal undertakings engaged in interprovincial
transportation and communication.
15
Toronto (City) v. Bell Telephone Co. of Canada, [1904] J.C.J. No. 2, [1905] A.C. 52
(P.C.) [hereinafter “Bell 1905”].
16
[1954] J.C.J. No. 1, [1954] A.C. 541 (P.C.).
17
[1954] S.C.J. No. 14, [1954] S.C.R. 207 (S.C.C.).
18
Supra, note 3.
19
Id., at 774.
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The leading case in the trilogy is Bell 1988.20 The issue in that case
was whether Bell Canada, an interprovincial telephone company, was
bound by the Quebec Act Respecting Occupational Health and Safety,21
which required the protective reassignment of pregnant workers who
worked with video monitors. Justice Beetz wrote for the Court that the
provincial law was constitutionally incapable of applying to the federal
undertaking, and must be read down. He acknowledged that the law did
not paralyze or impair the operation of the federal undertaking, but held
that “it is sufficient that the provincial statute which purports to apply to
the federal undertaking affects a vital or essential part of that undertaking,
without necessarily going as far as impairing or paralyzing it”.22 Since
the occupational health and safety law regulated labour relations, that
was enough to affect a vital part of the management and operation of the
firm.23
In the second case of the trilogy, Canadian National Railway,24 an
inspector under the Quebec Act Respecting Occupational Health and
Safety initiated an investigation into a collision in the province between
two trains owned by Canadian National Railway. The provisions of the
Act authorized the inspector to issue remedial orders, to fix a time for
compliance with these orders, and even to close down a workplace if the
safety of workers was endangered. The Court held that Canadian National
Railway, as a federal undertaking, was not bound by the provincial law
authorizing accident investigation.
In the third case of the trilogy, Alltrans Express,25 an officer of the
British Columbia Workers’ Compensation Board inspecting Alltrans’
place of business in British Columbia, discovered that certain employees
were wearing footwear prohibited by the British Columbia regulations.
He issued a report ordering the donning of proper footwear and the
formation of a safety committee under the British Columbia Workers’
Compensation Act.26 The Court held that Alltrans, as a federal undertaking,

20
21
22
23
24

Bell Canada v. Quebec, supra, note 4.
S.Q. 1979, c. 63.
Id., at 859-60.
Id., at 762.
Canadian National Railway Co. v. Courtois, [1988] S.C.J. No. 37, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 868

(S.C.C.).
25
Alltrans Express v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board), [1988] S.C.J. No. 38,
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 897 (S.C.C.).
26
R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 437.
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was not bound by the provincial law requiring the safety committee and
protective footwear.
In Bell 198827 and the other cases of the trilogy, Beetz J. rejected the
notion that there could be any concurrent provincial jurisdiction over a
vital part of a federal undertaking. He held that provincial statutes would
be inapplicable if they affected matters falling within the primary
jurisdiction of Parliament over federal works and undertakings. Any
effect on such matters would be fatal, regardless of the degree of
impairment or indeed any impairment at all. For Beetz J., each head of
federal legislative power is assigned “a basic, minimum and unassailable
content”,28 which falls within the primary jurisdiction of Parliament, and
because federal legislative authority is exclusive, that unassailable core
is immune from provincial laws. There is no requirement of any form of
adverse effect on the part of the provincial law. Outside the vital part of
a federal undertaking, and outside the core of a federal head of power,
the general pith and substance rule would still prevail, and provincial
laws could apply. In the world of Bell 1988, concurrent jurisdiction still
had life, but only outside the vital part or core of federal powers.
4. Direct Effect on a Vital Part of a Federal Undertaking
Only 11 months after the decision in Bell 1988, the Supreme Court
of Canada started wavering in its commitment to the “affecting a vital
part” test. In Irwin Toy v. Quebec29 the Court had to decide whether a
Quebec law that prohibited advertising directed at children could apply
to advertising on television, a federally regulated medium. The Court
held that the provincial law was applicable to advertising on television,
notwithstanding that advertising is a “vital part of the operation of a
television broadcast undertaking”.30 The Court in that case qualified the
broad articulation of the “affecting a vital part” test in Bell 198831 by
holding that the test only applied to provincial laws that purported to
apply “directly” to federal undertakings. Where a provincial law only
had an “indirect” effect on the undertaking, the law would not be
constitutionally inapplicable unless it impaired a vital part of the
27
28
29
30
31

[1988] S.C.J. No. 41, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 250.
[1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.).
Id., at 957.
Supra, note 28.
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undertaking.32 Since the provincial prohibition on advertising in that case
applied to advertisers, and the media were not directly prohibited from
carrying the advertising, the effect of the provincial law on the television
undertaking was indirect. Therefore, the test was impairment. Since the
Court held that the loss of children’s advertising could not impair the
operation of the television undertaking, the provincial law applied to
preclude advertisers in Quebec from placing advertisements directed at
children on television.
The distinction between direct and indirect effect made little sense.
This move was likely a result of the Court’s concern and realization in
the aftermath of Bell 1988 that the “affecting a vital part” test unduly
restricted provincial power over federal undertakings operating within
the province and the Court “saw this new refinement as a way of
loosening the constraints.”33 The vital part test continued to be used by
the courts34 until the Supreme Court revisited the issue in 2007.
5. Impairing a Vital Part of a Federal Undertaking
In 2007, a majority of the Supreme Court confirmed in Canadian
Western Bank v. Alberta35 that it had changed its mind about the test for
interjurisdictional immunity. The Court eliminated the direct-indirect
distinction introduced in Irwin Toy,36 and replaced “affecting” with
“impairment” as the universal standard for interjurisdictional immunity
from provincial laws purporting to apply to a vital part of a federal
undertaking. Writing for the majority, Binnie and LeBel JJ. held that
interjurisdictional immunity would apply only if a “core competence” of
Parliament or “a vital or essential part of an undertaking it constitutes”
would be “impaired” by a provincial law. Impairment would involve an
“adverse consequence” that placed the core or vital part “in jeopardy”,
although “without necessarily ‘sterilizing’ or ‘paralyzing’”.37 If the core

32

Supra, note 29, at 955.
D. Gibson, “Comment” (1990) 69 Can. Bar Rev. 339, at 353.
34
For example, see Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] S.C.J. No.
99, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327 (S.C.C.); Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3
S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.); Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] S.C.J. No. 84, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437 (S.C.C.);
Mississauga (City) v. Greater Toronto Airports Authority, [2000] O.J. No. 4086, 50 O.R. (3d) 641
(Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 83 (S.C.C.).
35
[2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
36
Supra, note 29.
37
Supra, note 35, at para. 48.
33
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competence or vital part was merely “affected” by a provincial law
(without any adverse consequence), no immunity would apply.
The issue in Canadian Western Bank was whether the licensing
regime of Alberta’s Insurance Act,38 which required a “deposit-taking
institution” to obtain a licence from the province and comply with
provincial consumer-protection laws in order to promote insurance to its
customers, constitutionally applied to the banks, which are federally
regulated undertakings. The federal Bank Act39 had been amended in
1991 to grant the banks the power to promote to their customers certain
types of creditors’ insurance against events that would impair their
borrowers’ ability to repay a loan from the bank, for example, the death,
disability or loss of employment of the borrower. The bank argued that
the lending of money and the taking of security by banks were vital
functions of banking, and the close relationship of creditors’ insurance to
those functions made the promotion of insurance by banks a vital part of
banking. The Court held that the vital part of an undertaking should be
limited to functions that were “essential” or “indispensable” or
“necessary” to the federal character of the undertaking; and that the
promotion of insurance by banks was too far removed from the core of
banking to qualify as a vital part of the banking undertaking.40
Consequently, the Alberta Insurance Act validly applied to the banks
when they promoted insurance.
A second decision was handed down by the Supreme Court at the
same time as Canadian Western Bank. British Columbia v. Lafarge
Canada41 dealt with the application of municipal zoning and property
development by-laws to the construction of a concrete-mixing facility on
port lands owned by the Vancouver Port Authority, a federal
undertaking. On the federal side, the Canada Marine Act,42 enacted
under the federal power over navigation and shipping, authorizes landuse regulation in Canada’s ports, and the Vancouver Port Authority is
the regulator in Vancouver. On the provincial side, no fewer than eight
municipalities intersect with the port, each with the authority under
provincial law to enact zoning by-laws and require land-use approvals.
Lafarge proposed to build a concrete batch plant at a site in the port,
38
39
40
41
42

R.S.A. 2000, c. I-3.
S.C. 1991, c. 46.
Supra, note 35, at paras. 51, 63.
[2007] S.C.J. No. 23, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 86 (S.C.C.).
S.C. 1998, c. 10.

634

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)

which was approved by the Vancouver Port Authority. The development
was challenged by a local ratepayers’ association, which relied on the
fact that the proposed site was also within the boundaries of the City of
Vancouver, and which argued that the City by-law requiring a
development permit should have also been complied with.
Justices Binnie and LeBel, writing for the majority, affirmed the
Court’s commitment to the new policy of restraint on interjurisdictional
immunity. Although the development of a marine facility on port lands
for the mixing of concrete was within the federal power over navigation
and shipping, they held that the regulation of the development “lies
beyond the core of s. 91(10)”.43 Therefore, interjurisdictional immunity
did not apply. The Court, however, went on to hold that the by-law
conflicted with the Canada Marine Act and was therefore inoperative by
reason of federal paramountcy. Justice Bastarache, in a concurring
opinion, placed his decision firmly on interjurisdictional immunity. He
held that the regulation of land use in support of port operations on port
lands was within “the core” of navigation and shipping,44 and therefore
immune from provincial or municipal laws that would impair the federal
regime. In the end, then, the Court was unanimous that the Vancouver
Port Authority’s approval was all that was needed for the Lafarge
development.
The Supreme Court of Canada has a very active view of its judicial
role and does not hesitate from time to time to reformulate doctrine that
has appeared settled for some time. That is clearly what has happened
with Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge. However, it is interesting to
notice that in neither case was it necessary to rule on the requirement of
impairment because in both cases the majority held that the provincial
law did not touch the vital part or core of the federal undertaking. It
made no difference to the result whether the test was impairing or
affecting, because the provincial law would apply in either case (unless
pre-empted by paramountcy as the majority held in Lafarge). The new
standard of impairment has its provenance only in obiter dicta, but it is
plain that the majority of the Court is determined to change the standard
from affecting to impairing, thereby narrowing the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity.
43
Supra, note 41, at para. 72. Title to the site was in the Vancouver Port Authority
(“VPA”), which was not for that purpose an agent of the federal Crown. If, however, the VPA had
been a Crown agent, or if the site had been federal Crown land, then its development would have
been “exclusively within federal jurisdiction” (at para. 51).
44
Id., at paras. 127-133.
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IV. SHOULD INTERJURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY BE NARROWED?
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Canadian Western
Bank45 and Lafarge46 are perhaps the most important federalism rulings
in 20 years. Moving back from an “affects” test to a stricter test based on
“impairment”, the Court has considerably restrained the application of
the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine. This move can be justified on
at least two grounds.
First, a stricter application of interjurisdictional immunity is more
consistent with the pith and substance doctrine, which embraces the
possibility of overlap between federal and provincial laws. The
“affecting a vital part” test for interjurisdictional immunity carved a
considerable exception out of the general (pith and substance) rule of
concurrency between federal and provincial laws. It precluded the
application of provincial law to federal undertakings whenever there was
any effect on a vital part of the federal undertaking. The pith and
substance doctrine, which stipulates that a law in relation to a provincial
matter may validly affect a federal matter, remained relevant only if the
law did not touch a vital part of a federal undertaking or a core element
of a federal subject matter. A narrower doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity, grounded in impairment, leaves more room for the
concurrence of provincial and federal jurisdiction and more room for
provincial legislatures to regulate property and civil rights within
provincial boundaries.
Second, from a policy perspective, the immunity of federal
undertakings from provincial law can be seen as superfluous since the
rule of federal paramountcy already limits the ability of provincial
legislatures to intrude into federal jurisdiction — as long as there is
federal regulation in place that creates a conflict with the provincial law.
Even in the absence of federal regulation, Parliament always has the
choice of legislating if it does not approve of the application of a
provincial law to a matter within federal jurisdiction. Pursuant to
paramountcy, if the new federal law conflicts with the provincial law,
the federal law will prevail. In that way, Parliament retains the option to
provide whatever protection from provincial law it believes is necessary
for federal undertakings. However, unless Parliament has acted in this
deliberate way, a stricter test of interjurisdictional immunity promotes
45
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greater respect for the ordinary operation of statutes enacted by both
levels of government. It also respects the principle of subsidiarity that
decision-making should take place at the level of government closest to
the individuals affected.
Those two points of principle are what drove the Court to narrow the
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, and they certainly have force.
On the other side of the issue, is the practical inconvenience that the new
rule will cause for federally regulated undertakings such as telephone
companies, airlines, railways and banks. These undertakings, which are
already subject to federal regulation, now also have to comply with the
law of every province and territory in which they operate. Many of the
provinces have enacted new consumer protection laws in the past
decade, and they differ considerably one from another. The licensing
requirement imposed on the banks in Canadian Western Bank means
that the protection of bank portfolios by creditors’ insurance now comes
at the cost of compliance with as many as 13 distinct licensing regimes.
It is true, of course, that national enterprises that are not federally
regulated also have to comply with distinct laws in every province or
territory in which they operate, but that is inescapable in the absence of
any federal regulatory power, and at least their businesses are subject to
only one level of regulation within each province or territory.
And it goes beyond inconvenience. The federal regulation governing
a federal undertaking will have been enacted pursuant to a policy that
has been developed specifically for that business, whether it be banking,
telephones, radio, television, railways or airlines. The provincial laws
potentially applicable to the federal undertaking, on the other hand, will
be laws of general application. Provincial regulators will not have
thought about the impact of their laws on federal undertakings, and if
they had given the matter any thought they would lack the expertise that
the federal regulators possess by virtue of being the primary regulator of
that business. Provincial laws will inevitably have unintended
consequences for federal undertakings. Narrowing the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity, therefore, not only enhances the exposure
of federal undertakings to double regulation, it risks the infliction of
collateral damage from provincial laws of general application that were
not directed at them. It is true that federally regulated undertakings are
still exempt from provincial laws that impair a vital part of the
undertaking, but the Court’s narrow definition of the vital part in
Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge undoubtedly leaves much of the
business of federal undertakings subject to provincial law. The merit of
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the old “affecting” standard, coupled as it was with a generous view of
the vital part or core of the undertaking, was to liberate federal
undertakings from much provincial regulation, simplifying their ability
to operate throughout the country in accordance with the national
policies developed by federal regulators.
It is also true that federally regulated undertakings could be
protected from provincial regulation by enacting a federal law that
ousted provincial law through the doctrine of paramountcy. However,
Parliament’s ability to accomplish that result is fraught with legal and
political challenges. In the first place, as a legal matter, it is not easy to
design the federal law that would unarguably create a conflict with all
provincial regulation, because the definition of conflict for the purpose
of paramountcy has been drawn very narrowly by the Supreme Court.
Second, as a political matter, the enactment of a law with the express
intention of ousting provincial law is likely to disturb federal-provincial
relations. Parliament may well prefer not to act, and arguably should not
be burdened with an obligation to act, simply to negate provincial laws
regarding significant federal matters.
Our conclusion is that there is no easy answer to the appropriate
accommodation of provincial laws to federal values. Narrowing the
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity was a rational move for all the
reasons discussed above, but the practical and theoretical challenges
associated with that move warrant consideration as well. These issues
were not discussed by the Supreme Court in the reasons for judgment in
Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge, despite the fact that the Court
went out of its way — even beyond the necessities of the two cases — to
reverse long-standing doctrine upon which both levels of government, as
well as private federal undertakings, had come to rely. Provincial and
federal regulators and private federal undertakings all now have to go
back to their lawyers for advice as to which provincial laws now apply to
federal undertakings. That advice is not easy to give without more
guidance as to how the Court will apply the narrower definition of the
vital part and the new standard of impairment in future cases. Some of
the passages of the reasons are unusual for a judicial opinion, for
example, the assertion that “the Court does not favour an intensive
reliance on the doctrine [of interjurisdictional immunity]”,47 and the
assertion that the doctrine “should in general be reserved for situations
47
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covered by precedent”.48 It is possible that these statements mean
nothing that is not in the rest of the reasons, but they do suggest that the
protected core and the notion of impairment may be interpreted in
restrictive ways in future. Certainly, the law has been left in a much less
settled state.
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Id., at para. 77.

